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SOUND THE ALARM:  
LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY 
IN ALARM SERVICE CONTRACTS 
Joshua N. Cohen* 
 
Home and business owners increasingly rely on alarm systems to protect 
against theft and property damage.  When a burglary or fire occurs and an 
alarm service customer discovers that the alarm company negligently failed 
to call the police or fire department, the customer understandably would 
expect redress for the company’s failure to provide its service.  Many 
customers would be surprised, though, to discover that an alarm company’s 
liability is often contractually limited to a relatively token amount unrelated 
to the cost of the service, even when the alarm company is negligent. 
Some states view these limitations of liability as exculpatory clauses and 
determine their enforceability based on whether they are unconscionable or 
violate public policy.  Other states view them as liquidated damages and 
apply a penalty test to determine their enforceability.  This Note addresses 
the differences between these two approaches in the context of the unique 
remedy difficulties inherent in alarm service contracts.  This Note then 
argues that the prevailing policy rationales for enforcing alarm service 
provisions that limit a party’s liability for its own negligence are misguided 
and advocates that these provisions should not be enforced as a matter of 
public policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After a long day of work, the manager of a grocery store ends his evening 
shift, as he always does, by setting the store’s burglar alarm and locking the 
building.  Just as he is about to get in his car and head home for the day, 
however, an armed robber accosts him in the parking lot and forces him to 
return to the store at gunpoint.  Against his will, the manager leads the 
robber into the grocery’s inner office and opens the store’s safe.  The robber 
then ties up the manager with tape and proceeds to empty the safe.  
Throughout this terrifying ordeal, the manager’s only comfort was that he 
did not disarm the burglar alarm when he unlocked the store.  Surely the 
police would arrive soon. 
Despite receiving the alarm signal, the burglar alarm company does not 
notify the police, and the robber makes his getaway fourteen minutes after 
the alarm first activates.  It is not until after the robber flees with over 
$35,000 from the safe that the manager, still bound with tape, is able to 
maneuver to a telephone and call for help.  The police arrive two minutes 
later—too late to catch the robber. 
This scenario is based on the facts of Better Food Markets v. American 
District Telephone Co.,1 where the California Supreme Court ruled there 
was sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find that the alarm 
company’s failure to perform its contractual duty to notify the police was 
the proximate cause of the grocery store’s $35,930 loss.2  Nevertheless, the 
 
 1. 253 P.2d 10 (Cal. 1953). 
 2. Id. at 12–13. 
2016] LIABILITY IN ALARM SERVICE CONTRACTS 815 
court limited the grocery store’s recovery to $50.3  Why only $50?  Because 
the burglar alarm contract provided that “liability . . . shall be limited to and 
fixed at the sum of fifty dollars as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, 
and this liability shall be exclusive.”4 
Many home and business monitoring service contracts contain similar 
provisions5 and customers, who are often surprised to find that these 
provisions apply even when the alarm company is at fault, have a strong 
incentive to challenge the enforceability of these clauses.6  Different states 
apply different tests to determine the enforceability of contract clauses that, 
like the provision in Better Food Markets, limit a party’s liability to a 
specific dollar amount for damages caused by negligence.7 
Scholars have observed the distinction between liquidated damages and 
limitation-of-liability clauses,8 discussed the enforceability of exculpatory9 
and liquidated damages10 clauses in general, and examined the 
enforceability of limitation-of-liability clauses in specific areas such as 
professional service contracts.11  However, none have addressed the unique 
policy concerns generated by limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service 
contracts.  This Note discusses the inconsistent manner in which states 
determine the enforceability of such provisions and analyzes whether these 
provisions should be enforced.  Some jurisdictions, such as Connecticut, 
 
 3. Id. at 16. 
 4. Id. at 13. 
 5. See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of Exculpatory and Limitation of Liability Clauses in Burglary, Fire, and Other 
Home and Business Monitoring Service Contracts, 36 A.L.R.6th 305 (2008). 
 6. See Eric Dexheimer, With Failures, Alarm Companies Have Little Liability, 
MYSTATESMAN (Jan. 25, 2014, 7:48 PM), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/news/with-
failures-alarm-companies-have-little-liabilit/nc3Dj/ [https://perma.cc/6WAP-DTQY].  As 
alarm systems grow more sophisticated, these lawsuits may become more common. See 
Complaint at 1, Hernandez v. ADT Corp., No. 9:16-cv-80335 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2016) 
(alleging that ADT’s wireless signals can be “intercepted and interfered with by 
unauthorized third parties”); see also Emily Field, Suit Says ADT Security Systems Leave 
Homes Vulnerable, LAW360 (Mar. 8, 2016, 4:51 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
768812 [https://perma.cc/XT9T-7LCY]; Kashmir Hill, How Your Security System Could Be 
Hacked to Spy on You, FORBES (July 23, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/kashmirhill/2014/07/23/how-your-security-system-could-be-used-to-spy-on-you/#3bf21 
146198b [https://perma.cc/2X9X-RDRB]. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See generally William F. Fritz, “Underliquidated” Damages as Limitation of 
Liability, 33 TEX. L. REV. 196 (1954); Debora L. Threedy, Liquidated and Limited Damages 
and the Revision of Article 2:  An Opportunity to Rethink the U.C.C.’s Treatment of Agreed 
Remedies, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 427 (1991); Elizabeth Warren, Formal and Operative Rules 
Under Common Law and Code, 30 UCLA L. REV. 898 (1983). 
 9. See generally Scott J. Burnham, Are You Free to Contract Away Your Right to Bring 
a Negligence Claim?, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379 (2014); Lynn Guissinger, Note, 
Exculpatory Clauses and Public Policy:  A Judicial Dilemma, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 793 
(1982). 
 10. See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties 
and the Just Compensation Principle:  Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory 
of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977). 
 11. See generally John Terwilleger, Note, Can a Professional Limit Liability 
Contractually Under Florida Law?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1351 (2013). 
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have yet to definitively weigh in on which test they will use,12 providing 
them with an opportunity to choose the best method of determining the 
enforceability of these limitation-of-liability provisions. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of three types of contractual 
provisions that manage liability:  exculpatory clauses, liquidated damages 
clauses, and limitation-of-liability clauses.  Part II explores the two primary 
tests that states use to determine the enforceability of limitation-of-liability 
clauses like the clause in Better Food Markets.  Finally, Part III considers 
the better test to determine the enforceability of limitation-of-liability 
clauses that limit a party’s liability to a specific dollar amount for damages 
caused by negligence.  It then argues that such clauses should not be 
enforceable in alarm service contracts—courts should find them 
unconscionable, and legislatures should declare them void as a matter 
public policy. 
I.  EXCULPATORY, LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, 
AND LIMITATION-OF-LIABILITY CLAUSES:  
THREE METHODS TO MANAGE LIABILITY 
Contracts often contain provisions designed to limit the scope of a party’s 
liability.  Exculpatory clauses are designed to relieve a party from liability 
for a negligent or wrongful act.13  Liquidated damages clauses determine, in 
advance, the measure of damages if a party breaches a contract.14  A hybrid 
of these two types of contractual clauses, limitation-of-liability clauses, 
restrict the measure of damages regardless of the actual damages ultimately 
suffered.15  Unlike liquidated damages clauses, limitation-of-liability 
clauses do not purport to estimate the harm caused by a breach.16  In 
contrast to exculpatory clauses, however, limitation-of-liability clauses do 
not completely disclaim liability for a party’s negligence; rather, such 
clauses limit recoverable damages beyond a specific (maximum) dollar 
amount.17 
Part I.A discusses exculpatory clauses and the traditional methods of 
determining their enforceability:  addressing whether a contract is 
procedurally and substantively unconscionable or whether the clause 
violates public policy.  Part I.B discusses liquidated damages clauses, 
distinguishes between overliquidated and underliquidated damages, and 
details the traditional tests to determine their enforceability.  Finally, Part 
 
 12. See infra Part II.C. 
 13. See Exculpatory Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 14. Liquidated Damages Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 15. See Nahra v. Honeywell, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 962, 969 (N.D. Ohio 1995). 
 16. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 339 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
 17. See Wedner v. Fid. Sec. Sys., Inc., 307 A.2d 429, 431 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973) 
(describing a limitation-of-liability clause as allowing recovery up to a contracted amount, 
beyond which further recovery is unavailable); Terwilleger, supra note 11, at 1365 (“[T]here 
is a key difference between exculpatory clauses and limitation of liability clauses, because an 
exculpatory clause ‘insulates a party from liability,’ while a limitation of liability clause 
‘merely places a limit upon that liability.’” (quoting Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assocs., Inc., 
44 F.3d 195, 202 (3d Cir. 1995))). 
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I.C describes limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service contracts—the 
primary focus of this Note—and addresses whether they should be 
characterized as exculpatory clauses or liquidated damages clauses for 
enforceability purposes. 
A.  Exculpatory Clauses, Unconscionability, 
and Public Policy 
To determine the enforceability of an exculpatory clause that denies an 
injured party the right to recover damages from another’s negligence, courts 
typically analyze whether the clause is unconscionable or void as a matter 
of public policy.18  Part I.A.1 and I.A.2 provide an overview of 
unconscionability doctrine and public policy considerations, respectively. 
1.  Unconscionability Doctrine 
Unconscionability refers to the “absence of meaningful choice on the part 
of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably 
favorable to the other party.”19  Traditionally, a contract was said to be 
unconscionable if it was “such as no man in his senses and not under 
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would 
accept on the other.”20  Today, a showing of unconscionability generally 
requires two elements:  procedural unconscionability and substantive 
unconscionability.21 
Procedural unconscionability refers to “whether the imposed-upon party 
had meaningful choice about whether and how to enter into the 
transaction.”22  By itself, an unequal bargaining position between parties 
does not make a contract procedurally unconscionable.23  However, gross 
inequality of bargaining power weighs in favor of finding that the weaker 
party had no meaningful choice in assenting to the contract’s terms, 
especially in the presence of factors such as 
belief by the stronger party that there is no reasonable probability that the 
weaker party will fully perform the contract; knowledge of the stronger 
party that the weaker party will be unable to receive substantial benefits 
from the contract; [and] knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker 
 
 18. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 283 (2004). 
 19. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); 
accord Desiderio v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 207 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (quoting 
Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889)). 
 21. See 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed. 2010); see also Burnham, supra note 9, at 381 (“In the classical 
construct both [procedural and substantive unconscionability] are necessary for a finding of 
unconscionability.”). 
 22. 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 21, § 18:10.  Indeed, one of the fundamental 
rationales for setting aside contracts as unconscionable is to protect “parties with weak 
bargaining power from contractual overreaching by those with stronger bargaining power.” 
Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions:  Little Darlings and Little Monsters, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2043 (2011). 
 23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d. 
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party is unable reasonably to protect his interests by reason of physical or 
mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the 
language of the agreement, or similar factors.24 
For example, a contract may be procedurally unconscionable where the 
nondrafting party with an obvious lack of education did not have a 
reasonable opportunity to understand the contract’s terms because the terms 
were “hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales 
practices.”25 
Often, exculpatory clauses are found in standard-form contracts that are 
offered on a “take it or leave it” basis, known as contracts of adhesion.26  
However, the mere fact that an exculpatory clause appears in an adhesion 
contract is not enough to establish procedural unconscionability.27  Instead, 
“[t]here must be an additional showing of great disparity in bargaining 
power between the parties, of lack of opportunity for negotiation, or of 
inability to obtain the offered services elsewhere.”28  In contracts between 
large businesses and consumers, the ability of the consumer to obtain the 
services elsewhere is often the dispositive factor in determining procedural 
unconscionability.29  As long as the consumer is free to “leave it”—forgo 
the service or obtain it elsewhere—even an adhesion contract is unlikely to 
be procedurally unconscionable.30  Accordingly, the existence of a market 
for the service weighs against a finding of procedural unconscionability.31  
This is consistent with economists’ views that exculpatory clauses, like 
other contract terms, are “matter[s] of individual liberty that should be left 
to the market.”32 
Substantive unconscionability refers to whether the terms of a contract 
are unreasonably favorable to the stronger party.33  Factors that favor a 
finding of substantive unconscionability include terms that contravene 
public interest or public policy, terms that impermissibly alter fundamental 
duties imposed by law, provisions that negate the reasonable expectations 
of the nondrafting party, and terms that are unreasonably and unexpectedly 
harsh that benefit the drafting party at the nondrafting party’s expense.34  
When determining substantive unconscionability, courts look for “terms 
that are so oppressive that no reasonable person would make them and no 
fair and honest person would accept them.”35  Notably, courts will not 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 26. See Burnham, supra note 9, at 381; Guissinger, supra note 9, at 795. 
 27. See Burnham, supra note 9, at 381. 
 28. Guissinger, supra note 9, at 795. 
 29. See id. at 798. 
 30. See id. at 799–800. 
 31. Burnham, supra note 9, at 383. 
 32. Id. at 380. 
 33. See 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 21, § 18:10. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Burnham, supra note 9, at 384. 
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enforce exculpatory clauses that attempt to insulate a tortfeasor from 
gross—willful or wanton—negligence.36 
To determine the overall enforceability of a provision, courts often 
balance procedural and substantive unconscionability.37  In this manner, 
“the greater the harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms, the 
less important the regularity of the process of contract formation that gave 
rise to the term becomes.”38  Likewise, “[w]hen there is clear procedural 
unconscionability, . . . even minimal substantive unfairness may be enough 
to justify declaring the contract or clause unconscionable, and even a 
substantively fair bargain may be declared unconscionable if the procedural 
defects are great enough.”39 
2.  Public Policy 
Closely related to the notion that a court should not enforce an 
unconscionable contract is the doctrine that a court should not enforce a 
contract that violates public policy.  A finding that a provision violates 
public policy is based on the idea that “an obligation of care owed by one 
person to another outweigh[s] [the] traditional regard for freedom of 
contract.”40  While public policy determinations depend on the 
circumstances of each case,41 the Supreme Court of California articulated 
six commonly cited factors42 in Tunkl v. Regents of University of 
California43 typical of exculpatory clauses that are invalid as against public 
policy:  (1) the business is “generally thought suitable for public 
regulation”; (2) the service is of great importance to the public and “often a 
matter of practical necessity for some members of the public”; (3) the 
service provider holds itself out as willing to provide it to any member of 
the public (who meets certain established standards); (4) because of the 
essential nature of the service, the provider has a decisive advantage in 
bargaining power; (5) the provider employs standardized contracts and 
makes no provision for purchasers to pay an additional (reasonable) fee to 
protect against negligence; and (6) “as a result of the transaction, the person 
or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject 
to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.”44 
In summary, a court may refuse to enforce an exculpatory clause that 
denies an injured party the right to recover damages from another’s 
negligence if the court finds that the clause is unconscionable or contrary to 
public policy.  After such a finding, a court may (1) refuse to enforce the 
 
 36. See Fritz, supra note 8, at 209; Guissinger, supra note 9, at 795 n.6 (citing Jones v. 
Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981)). 
 37. See 8 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 21, § 18:14. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 11 (Wash. 1992). 
 41. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 283 (2004). 
 42. See Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795, 798 (Vt. 1995) (“Numerous courts have 
adopted and applied the Tunkl factors.”). 
 43. 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963). 
 44. Id. at 444–46 (footnotes omitted). 
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contract, (2) enforce the remainder of the contract without the exculpatory 
clause, or (3) limit the application of the exculpatory clause to avoid the 
undesirable result.45  In the context of a negligence action, finding an 
exculpatory clause to be unconscionable or contrary to public policy would 
mean that the plaintiff would not be contractually barred from pursuing her 
underlying claim. 
B.  Liquidated Damages Clauses and the Penalty Test 
Liquidated damages clauses, which specify an agreed amount of damages 
for a breach of contract, are subject to strict judicial scrutiny.46  In contrast 
to exculpatory clauses, the validity of a liquidated damages clause depends 
on (1) whether the specified amount is a reasonable estimate of anticipated 
or actual damages from a breach and (2) whether such damages would be 
difficult to prove.47  A provision that fails to satisfy both criteria is deemed 
an unenforceable penalty,48 which is why this is known as the “penalty 
rule” or the “penalty test.” 
The two prongs of this test are closely related in that the reasonableness 
of the fixed damages is proportional to the difficulty of proving actual loss 
or establishing the amount of actual loss with certainty.49  “If the difficulty 
of proof of loss is great, considerable latitude is allowed in the 
approximation of anticipated or actual harm.  If, on the other hand, the 
difficulty of proof of loss is slight, less latitude is allowed in that 
approximation.”50 
While parties are free to fix reasonable damages by contract when actual 
damages would be difficult to estimate or prove, parties are not free to 
provide penalties for breach.51  This is because contract remedies are 
intended to be compensatory, not punitive.52  A liquidated damages clause 
violates public policy and is termed a “penalty” when it has the intended or 
actual effect of punishing a party for breaching a contract.53  Essentially, a 
liquidated damages clause must not create such a large disparity between 
the negotiated damages and the actual damages likely to be caused by a 
breach that it acts in terrorem to induce performance by making a breach 
 
 45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 46. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 554 (“For more than five centuries, strict 
judicial scrutiny has been applied to contractual provisions which specify an agreed amount 
of damages upon breach of a base obligation.”). 
 47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356. 
 48. See 24 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 65:1 (4th ed. 2002). 
 49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. b. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. § 356 cmt. a. 
 52. Id.; see Fritz, supra note 8, at 197–98 (“[A] court will enforce an agreement for the 
payment of a stipulated sum, whether it is denominated liquidated damages or penalty, only 
where the court finds that the parties in fact intended its payment as compensation for the 
anticipated breach, having due regard for the principles of compensation as worked out by 
the courts.”). 
 53. See 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 48, § 65:1. 
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unreasonably costly.54  Once designated a penalty, a clause that attempts to 
liquidate damages “will not be enforced despite the expressed intention of 
the parties.”55  In theory, the penalty rule protects against both the unfair 
recovery by the nonbreaching party in the event of breach, as well as the 
inefficient performance of a contract by the other party when it would 
otherwise be economically efficient to breach.56 
Liquidated damages clauses can be overcompensatory or 
undercompensatory.57  The typical liquidated damages case involves 
overcompensatory damages, which are damages greater than those 
traditionally available under contract law.58  In such a case, “it is the 
breaching party who attacks the enforceability of the liquidated damages 
clause.”59  However, in an undercompensatory liquidated damages case, the 
damages an aggrieved party can prove under traditional contract law exceed 
the liquidated damages.60  In contrast to the typical case, then, these 
“underliquidated” damages become “the breaching party’s shield from 
provable damages rather than the aggrieved party’s sword for enhanced 
damages.  The judge must decide if the underliquidated damages clause is 
the exclusive remedy or if the plaintiff may instead recover actual damages 
or specific performance.”61 
If enforced, an underliquidated damages clause denies the aggrieved 
party its traditional contract remedies and functions effectively as a 
limitation-of-liability clause.62  If, however, a court rules that an 
underliquidated damages clause is unenforceable, the plaintiff is no longer 
contractually prohibited from proving and collecting actual damages.63 
C.  Limitation-of-Liability Clauses 
If unconscionability doctrine and public policy determine the 
enforceability of exculpatory clauses, and the penalty test determines the 
enforceability of liquidated damages clauses, then what is the proper test to 
determine the enforceability of limitation-of-liability clauses?  To help 
answer this question, Part I.C.1 provides a general overview of limitation-
of-liability clauses.  Then, Part I.C.2 describes the particular limitation-of-
liability provisions characteristic of alarm service contracts. 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 576. 
 56. See id. at 556. 
 57. See Threedy, supra note 8, at 429. 
 58. Warren, supra note 8, at 901. 
 59. Threedy, supra note 8, at 429. 
 60. See Warren, supra note 8, at 901. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 902 n.21. 
 63. See id. at 906. 
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1.  Limitations of Liability 
Generally, limitation-of-liability clauses are scrutinized under the same 
unconscionability or public policy standards as exculpatory clauses.64  This 
tends to be true even where, as in the Better Food Markets contract, the 
clause is described as a liquidated damages provision.65 
One rationale for applying the test for exculpatory clauses rather than the 
test for liquidated damages clauses is that, unlike a penalty, a limitation-of-
liability clause does not operate in terrorem to induce performance by 
making a breach unreasonably costly.66  “[T]o apply literally the concept of 
‘penalty’ to test performance of underliquidated damages is patent 
nonsense.  No underliquidated damages clause will ever penalize the 
breaching party.”67 
Another rationale for distinguishing limitation-of-liability clauses from 
liquidated damages clauses stems from their different evidentiary burdens at 
trial.  “[T]he purpose of a liquidated damages provision is to obviate the 
need for the nonbreaching party to prove actual damages.”68  After 
establishing proof of breach, the aggrieved party is entitled to the liquidated 
amount without having to establish the exact amount of actual damages.69  
Where a limitation of liability is present, though, a plaintiff is required to 
prove actual damages as part of her claim.70  In this manner, a limitation of 
liability represents a damages ceiling rather than a stipulation of damages. 
Furthermore, limitation-of-liability clauses and overcompensatory 
liquidated damages may present differing fairness concerns.  In some sense, 
both might seem “as repugnant” because they both “deny to the promisee 
the remedy for nonperformance which the law normally affords him.”71  
However, overcompensatory liquidated damages provide an unjustified 
gain to a party, while limitation-of-liability clauses burden a party with an 
uncompensated loss.72  The latter instance might be justified as merely an 
unsavory consequence of a party’s right to contract away its remedies (as 
with exculpatory clauses), but there are no “comparable rights lying on the 
stricter side of contract” to justify the former, which attempts to exercise 
more power than traditionally allowed under contract law.73 
 
 64. See 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 48, § 65:6. 
 65. See id. But see infra Part II.B. 
 66. See 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 48, § 65:6. 
 67. Warren, supra note 8, at 906 n.46. 
 68. Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ¶ 25, 20 P.3d 388, 394. 
 69. See 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 48, § 65:33. 
 70. See Mary G. Leary, Liability for Security or Burglar Alarm System Failure, 72 AM. 
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 1, 64 (2003); see also Fritz, supra note 8, at 201 n.17 (“A valid 
liquidated damages agreement permits recovery without proof of actual loss . . . .  An 
agreement for limitation of liability does not in terms promise the payment of any sum; 
actual damages must be proved in the usual fashion to the amount recoverable within the 
limit fixed.”). 
 71. Fritz, supra note 8, at 220. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Ian R. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 
511 n.54 (1962); accord Threedy, supra note 8, at 430 n.13 (“The rationale for this 
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2.  Limitations of Liability in Alarm Service Contracts 
Alarm service contracts commonly contain a limitation-of-liability 
clause.74  The contested provision in Nahra v. Honeywell, Inc.,75 provides 
an illustrative example: 
 It is understood and agreed by the parties hereto that Honeywell is 
providing a system designed to reduce the risk of loss; that the payments 
provided herein are based solely on the value of the services as described 
herein and are unrelated to the value of any property located on 
Customer’s premises; that Honeywell is not liable for losses which may 
occur in cases of malfunction or nonfunction of the system or of the 
monitoring, repairing, signaling [sic] handling or dispatching of the 
service, even if due to Honeywell’s negligence or failure of performance; 
that Honeywell is not an insurer; and that insurance, if any, covering 
personal injury and/or property loss or damage on customer’s premises 
shall be obtained and or maintained by Customer.  Customer understands 
that Honeywell offers several levels of protection and services and that the 
system described in the Schedule of Service and Protection has been 
chosen by Customer after considering and balancing the levels of 
protection afforded by various systems and the related costs. 
 IT IS AGREED THAT IT IS IMPRACTICAL AND EXTREMELY 
DIFFICULT TO FIX ACTUAL DAMAGES WHICH MAY ARISE IN 
SITUATIONS WHERE THERE MAY BE A FAILURE OF SERVICES 
PROVIDED, DUE TO THE UNCERTAIN VALUE OF CUSTOMER’S 
PROPERTY OR THE PROPERTY OF OTHERS KEPT ON THE 
PROTECTED PREMISES WHICH MAY BE LOST, STOLEN, 
DESTROYED, DAMAGED OR OTHERWISE AFFECTED BY 
OCCURRENCES WHICH THE SYSTEM OR SERVICE IS DESIGNED 
TO DETECT OR AVERT.  INABILITY OF CONTRACTOR TO 
GUARANTEE POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE 
TIME, AND ESTABLISHING A CASUAL [SIC] CONNECTION 
BETWEEN THE SYSTEM OR SERVICE PROBLEMS AND 
CUSTOMER’S POSSIBLE LOSS.  THEREFORE IF ANY LIABILITY 
IS IMPOSED ON HONEYWELL, SUCH LIABILITY SHALL BE 
LIMITED TO AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE ANNUAL SERVICE 
CHARGE OR $10,000, WHICHEVER IS LESS.  (IF THERE IS NO 
ANNUAL SERVICE CHARGE, HONEYWELL’S LIABILITY SHALL 
BE LIMITED TO $500.00.) [SIC]  THIS SUM SHALL BE PAID AND 
RECEIVED EITHER (i) AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND NOT AS 
A PENALTY, OR (ii) AS A LIMITATION OF LIABILITY APPROVED 
AND AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES.  THE PAYMENT OF THIS 
AMOUNT SHALL BE HONEYWELL’S SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE 
LIABILITY REGARDLESS OF WHETHER LOSS OR DAMAGE IS 
CAUSED BY THE PERFORMANCE OR NONPERFORMANCE OF 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THIS CONTRACT OR BY NEGLIGENCE, 
ACTIVE OR OTHERWISE, OF HONEYWELL, ITS EMPLOYEES, 
 
difference is that a party may waive or give up a right but may not contract for more than is 
allowable.”). 
 74. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 75. 892 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Ohio 1995). 
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AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES.  NO SUIT OR ACTION SHALL 
BE BROUGHT AGAINST HONEYWELL MORE THAN ONE (1) 
YEAR AFTER THE ACCRUAL OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION 
THEREFOR.76 
A few things from this excerpt are worth noting because they are 
characteristic of alarm service contracts and central to litigation challenging 
their enforceability:  (1) it contains a provision that disclaims the alarm 
company’s liability for losses caused by its own negligence and failure of 
performance, (2) it notes that the alarm company “is not an insurer,” (3) it 
states that actual damages are impractical and extremely difficult to fix, and 
(4) it provides for a fixed limit to the alarm company’s liability “as 
liquidated damages and not as a penalty” or “as a limitation of liability.”77 
One aspect of the Nahra contract that varies from case to case is the 
amount of damages specified as a limit.  In Nahra, this amount is the lesser 
of the annual service charge or $10,000 (or $500 in the absence of an 
annual service charge).78  The lesser of the two amounts in Nahra was the 
annual service charge, which totaled $2,124.79  In contrast, the amount 
specified in the Better Food Markets contract was $50, an amount unrelated 
to the cost of the service.80  While the amount varies between contracts, 
alarm service limitation-of-liability clauses typically provide for damages in 
one of four ways:  (1) a specific dollar amount;81 (2) the cost of service or a 
specific dollar amount, whichever is lesser;82 (3) the cost of service or a 
specific dollar amount, whichever is greater;83 or (4) the cost of service.84 
 
 76. Id. at 964–65 (alterations in original). 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. at 964 (“Plaintiffs agreed to pay a $177 monthly service fee.”). 
 80. See Better Food Mkts. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 253 P.2d 10, 13 (Cal. 1953). 
 81. See Donegal Mut. Ins. v. Tri-Plex Sec. Alarm Sys., 622 A.2d 1086, 1088 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1992) ($250); Bargaintown of D.C., Inc. v. Fed. Eng’g Co. of Wash., D.C., 309 
A.2d 56, 56–57 (D.C. 1973) ($25); Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 392, 
393 (Ohio 1984) ($50); Arthur’s Garage, Inc. v. Racal-Chubb Sec. Sys., Inc., 997 S.W.2d 
803, 809 (Tex. App. 1999) ($350). 
 82. See Gen. Bargain Ctr. v. Am. Alarm Co., 430 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) 
(“$250, or an amount equal to six monthly payments of $46.30 each, whichever [is] the 
lesser.”); Schrier v. Beltway Alarm Co., 533 A.2d 1316, 1318 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) 
(providing for six monthly payments of $49.50 per month or $250.00, “whichever is the 
lesser”); Morgan Co. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 246 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Minn. 1976) 
(“[S]ix (6) times the total monthly charge shown herein [of $82 per month], or . . . [$250.00], 
whichever sum shall be less.”); Sanif, Inc. v. Iannotti, 500 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (App. Div. 
1986) (providing for 10 percent of the $180 installation price or $250.00, “whichever is 
lesser”). 
 83. See Braden v. Honeywell, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 724, 726 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (“[S]ix (6) 
times the [$150] monthly charge . . . or $250 whichever is greater.”); Tessler & Son, Inc. v. 
Sonitrol Sec. Sys. of N. N.J., Inc., 497 A.2d 530, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) 
(“[T]en percent of the [$600] annual monitoring charge for the premises or $250 whichever 
is greater.”). 
 84. See Cent. Alarm of Tucson v. Ganem, 567 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) 
(“[A] sum equal in amount to the [$43 per month] rental service charged hereunder for a 
period of service not to exceed six months.”); Wedner v. Fid. Sec. Sys., Inc., 307 A.2d 429, 
430–31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973) (“[T]he yearly service charge [of $312].”). 
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One explanation for the peculiarity of the damages specified by these 
provisions may lie in the ongoing nature of alarm service contracts.  In 
contrast to service contracts that are one-shot deals, contracts that provide a 
full refund in the event that an alarm service company fails to provide its 
service, which would at least protect a customer’s restitution interest,85 may 
leave a customer better off than her precontract position.  For example, 
assume that a store equipped with an alarm experienced five burglaries in 
one year.  If the alarm service company negligently failed to call the police 
during only one of those burglaries but must nevertheless pay restitution for 
the cost of the full year’s service, then the store will have benefitted—free 
of charge—from the alarm company’s protection during the four other 
burglaries. 
As with exculpatory clauses86 and liquidated damages clauses,87 if a 
court finds a limitation-of-liability clause unenforceable, the plaintiff is no 
longer contractually prohibited from seeking actual damages for her 
underlying claim.88  When an alarm company negligently fails to provide 
its service, plaintiffs often allege both negligence and breach of contract 
simultaneously.89 
II.  DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DETERMINE THE ENFORCEABILITY 
OF LIMITATION-OF-LIABILITY CLAUSES 
There is a certain “schizophrenic quality of the law” when it comes to 
determining the enforceability of underliquidated damages clauses,90 and 
this is no less true when it comes to the enforceability of limitation-of-
liability clauses in alarm service contracts.  Most states determine the 
enforceability of limitation-of-liability clauses in home and business 
monitoring service contracts by using the same unconscionability and 
public policy analysis used for exculpatory clauses, but some state courts 
analyze these provisions as they would liquidated damages clauses.  
Meanwhile, some courts have yet to take a definitive stance regarding 
whether they will follow the majority or minority rule. 
Part II.A addresses the approach taken by a majority of courts, which 
analyzes limitation-of-liability clauses as exculpatory clauses for 
enforceability purposes.  Next, Part II.B describes the minority approach of 
applying the penalty test to determine the enforceability of limitation-of-
 
 85. See Restitution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (describing restitution as 
a remedy “in which the measure of recovery is usu[ally] based not on the plaintiff’s loss, but 
on the defendant’s gain”). 
 86. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 87. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Wyer v. Sonitrol Sec. Sys. of Hartford, Inc., 738 A.2d 1179, 1183 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 1999) (finding a limitation-of-liability clause unenforceable, thereby allowing the 
plaintiffs to proceed past summary judgment with their claim). 
 89. See id. at 1180 (“This action has been brought in two counts.  Count one is in 
negligence, and count two is in breach of contract.”); see also Braden v. Honeywell, Inc., 8 
F. Supp. 2d 724, 724 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (“Plaintiffs . . . bring this diversity action asserting 
claims of breach of contract and negligence against defendant Honeywell, Inc.”). 
 90. Threedy, supra note 8, at 453. 
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liability clauses.  Then, Part II.C discusses several jurisdictions where the 
rule is uncertain, either because courts apply both tests or because state 
supreme or appellate-level courts have yet to issue a definitive ruling.  In 
particular, this section discusses the uncertainty in Connecticut, where state 
appellate-level courts have not issued a decision interpreting the validity of 
limitation-of-liability provisions in alarm service contracts.91 
A.  The Majority Rule:  Limitation-of-Liability Clauses 
Are Enforceable Unless Unconscionable 
or Against Public Policy 
Of the states that have addressed the issue, a majority determine the 
enforceability of limitation-of-liability clauses that place a cap on 
recoverable damages from one party’s negligence by analyzing whether 
such clauses are unconscionable or void as a matter of public policy.92  For 
example, in Morgan Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.,93 the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld a provision in a burglar alarm system 
contract that limited an alarm seller’s liability for losses caused by the 
negligence of its employees to $250 because the provision was not 
unconscionable nor did it violate public policy.94  There, the Minnesota 
court refused to analyze the provision as it would a liquidated damages 
clause despite the use of the words “liquidated damages” in the contract.95 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts distinguishes limitation-of-
liability clauses like the clause in Morgan from traditional liquidated 
damages clauses because the former attempt to fix unreasonably small, 
 
 91. See Forster v. Advanced Elec. Servs., Inc., No. X03CV010510854S, 2002 WL 
31463511, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2002). 
 92. See Fox Alarm Co. v. Wadsworth, 913 So. 2d 1070 (Ala. 2005); Cent. Alarm of 
Tucson v. Ganem, 567 P.2d 1203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh 
v. Guardtronic, Inc., 64 S.W.3d 779 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002); Donegal Mut. Ins. v. Tri-Plex Sec. 
Alarm Sys., 622 A.2d 1086 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992); L. Luria & Son, Inc. ex rel. Fireman’s 
Fund Ins. v. Alarmtec Int’l Corp., 384 So. 2d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Steiner Corp. v. 
Am. Dist. Tel., 683 P.2d 435 (Idaho 1984); Purolator Sec., Inc. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Serv., 
491 N.E.2d 161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Corral v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 732 P.2d 1260 
(Kan. 1987); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 241 S.W.3d 335 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 2006); Lazybug Shops, Inc. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 374 So. 2d 183 (La. Ct. App. 1979); 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Guardian Alarm Co. of Mich., 320 N.W.2d 244 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1982); Morgan Co. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 246 N.W.2d 443 (Minn. 1976); 
Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Exec. Beechcraft, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. 2001); New Light 
Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 525 N.W.2d 25 (Neb. 1994); Tessler & Son, Inc. v. 
Sonitrol Sec. Sys. of N. N.J., Inc., 497 A.2d 530 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Florence 
v. Merchs. Cent. Alarm Co., 412 N.E.2d 1317 (N.Y. 1980); Reed’s Jewelers, Inc. v. ADT 
Co., 260 S.E.2d 107 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Fretwell v. Prot. Alarm Co., 764 P.2d 149 (Okla. 
1988); Wedner v. Fid. Sec. Sys., Inc., 307 A.2d 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973); Ostalkiewicz v. 
Guardian Alarm, 520 A.2d 563 (R.I. 1987); Underwood v. Nat’l Alarm Servs., Inc., No. 
E2006-00107-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 1412040 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2007); Arthur’s 
Garage, Inc. v. Racal-Chubb Sec. Sys., Inc., 997 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. App. 1999); Jennings v. 
Brinks Home Sec., Inc., No. 22957-9-II, 1999 WL 615058 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 1999). 
 93. 246 N.W.2d 443 (Minn. 1976). 
 94. Id. at 448. 
 95. See id. 
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rather than unreasonably large, damages.96  Instead of applying the two-
prong test to determine whether such a clause is a penalty,97 the 
Restatement provides that unconscionability doctrine governs the clause’s 
enforceability.98  Some states expressly follow this approach.  For example, 
in Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc.,99 the Supreme 
Court of Missouri adopted the Restatement’s approach by holding that a 
clause fixing disproportionately large damages may be a penalty but that a 
clause fixing disproportionately small damages is subject to 
unconscionability analysis.100 
Some courts, in addition to looking for the presence of procedural and 
substantive unconscionability, place great weight on policy considerations 
when determining whether a limitation-of-liability clause is enforceable.101  
Commonly cited policy factors include (1) the effect on prices of holding a 
party liable for damages greater than the contracted amount, (2) the 
uncertainty of liability exposure, and (3) the ability of one party to be in a 
better position than the other to purchase liability insurance.102  An 
additional policy consideration provided by courts is whether the parties 
consciously allocated the risk of burglary to the customer rather than to the 
alarm service company.103 
Overall, the general trend in most courts has been to interpret limitation-
of-liability clauses in alarm service contracts in the same manner as 
exculpatory clauses, rather than liquidated damages clauses, and find that 
such clauses are not unconscionable or contrary to public policy.104 
B.  The Minority Rule:  Limitation-of-Liability Clauses 
Are Enforceable Unless Void as Penalties 
A minority of states, however, determine the validity of limitation-of-
liability clauses using the penalty test—the same analysis used to determine 
whether liquidated damages clauses are unenforceable penalties.  Among 
these states are Ohio and California.  The controlling case in Ohio is 
 
 96. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A 
term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy as a penalty.”), with id. § 356 cmt. a (“A term that fixes an unreasonably small 
amount as damages may be unenforceable as unconscionable.”). 
 97. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. d.  The U.C.C. adopts a 
similar approach, providing that limitations of liability that fail to provide “at least a fair 
quantum of remedy for breach” are subject to deletion as unconscionable. U.C.C. § 2-719 
cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014). 
 99. 59 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. 2001). 
 100. See id. at 510. 
 101. See Arthur’s Garage, Inc. v. Racal-Chubb Sec. Sys., Inc., 997 S.W.2d 803, 810–11 
(Tex. App. 1999) (ruling that policy reasons favored upholding a limitation-of-liability 
clause in an alarm service contract). 
 102. See id. 
 103. See Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. v. Burns Elec. Sec. Servs., Inc., 417 N.E.2d 131, 133 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
 104. See Gen. Bargain Ctr. v. Am. Alarm Co., 430 N.E.2d 407, 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) 
(citing twelve jurisdictions that have upheld limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service 
contracts). 
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Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,105 in which the Supreme Court of 
Ohio held that a limitation-of-liability clause, which limited an alarm 
company’s liability for damages caused by its negligence to $50, was an 
unenforceable penalty because the limitation was disproportionate to 
reasonably foreseeable damages and because damages were readily 
ascertainable.106  In doing so, the court applied the same test it uses to 
determine the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses.107 
The controlling case in California is Better Food Markets, in which a 
limitation-of-liability clause was upheld because it was a “reasonable 
endeavor by the parties to estimate a fair average compensation for any loss 
that may be sustained.”108  There, the California Supreme Court treated a 
provision that limited an alarm company’s liability for damages caused by 
negligence to $50 as a liquidated damages provision.109  Unlike the Ohio 
court in Samson Sales, however, the California court emphasized the 
impracticality or extreme difficulty of estimating damages at the time of 
contracting and opined that the greater the difficulty in estimating damages, 
the greater the range of estimates a court should uphold as reasonable.110 
It is not unusual that the Samson Sales court refused to enforce the 
underliquidated damages clause while the Better Food Markets court 
upheld a nearly identical provision.  Courts applying the penalty test to 
underliquidated damages clauses generate unpredictable results, and the 
outcomes of these cases do not seem to vary, as one might think they 
would, based on the disproportion between the liquidated damages and the 
actual damages.111 
One rationale for applying a liquidated damages analysis to determine the 
enforceability of limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service contracts—a 
rationale that favors finding such clauses unenforceable—was summarized 
well by Judge William F. Cercone, who dissented in Wedner v. Fidelity 
Security Systems, Inc.112: 
If the parties can escape their contractual provisions for liquidated 
damages because the amount stated is unreasonably disproportionate 
(either higher or lower) to the actual damages involved, there is no logical 
reason why the same test of reasonableness should not apply to a 
contractual limitation of liability.  I would hold therefore, that a 
 
 105. 465 N.E.2d 392 (Ohio 1984). 
 106. Id. at 394.  In addition to requiring that damages be “uncertain as to amount and 
difficult [to] pro[ve]” for such a contract to be enforceable, the Ohio court also specified that 
the contract as a whole must not be manifestly unconscionable and that it must be the clear 
intention of the parties that damages would be limited to the expressed amount in the event 
of a party’s negligence. Id. (quoting Jones v. Stevens, 146 N.E. 894, 895 (Ohio 1925)). 
 107. See id. at 393–94. 
 108. Better Food Mkts. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 253 P.2d 10, 15 (Cal. 1953). Contra id. at 
17 (Carter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he $50 provision bears no reasonable relation to any amount 
which might have been lost by a failure of the system to operate.”). 
 109. Id. at 13–16 (majority opinion). 
 110. Id. at 14–15. 
 111. See Warren, supra note 8, at 908–09 (describing eleven cases in which 
underliquidated damages were enforced or not enforced without any discernable pattern). 
 112. 307 A.2d 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973). 
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contractual limitation, as well as a contractual liquidation of damages, is 
not binding where unreasonable and bearing no relation to the loss that 
would result from defendant’s failure to fulfill the terms of its contract.  
The limitation in this case “to a sum equal in amount to the yearly service 
charge hereunder” was clearly unreasonable and arbitrary, bearing no 
relationship whatever to the damages flowing from defendant’s breach.  
In my opinion this provision, whether viewed as one of liquidated 
damages or as a limitation of damages, should not be enforced.113 
However, it is likely that courts apply a liquidated damages analysis to 
these provisions for a simpler reason.  Recall that alarm service contracts 
often refer to their limitation-of-liability clauses as “liquidated damages.”114  
It may be that some courts treat limitation-of-liability clauses as liquidated 
damages clauses solely because contracts designate them as such.115 
C.  Uncertain Jurisdictions:  A Look at Connecticut 
Some jurisdictions have yet to adopt a definitive test for how they 
enforce limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service contracts.  At least 
one jurisdiction—the District of Columbia—applies a liquidated damages 
analysis as well as an unconscionability analysis when determining the 
enforceability of these clauses.116  As mentioned above, a Connecticut 
appellate-level court has yet to decide the matter.117  Connecticut trial-level 
courts appear to adopt the minority rule of interpreting such provisions as 
liquidated damages clauses.  Federal courts applying Connecticut law, 
however, have viewed identical provisions as exculpatory clauses and 
applied the unconscionability and public policy test adopted by the majority 
of state courts. 
1.  Federal Application of Connecticut Law 
In Leon’s Bakery, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp.,118 the Second Circuit, applying 
Connecticut law, addressed the enforceability of a limitation-of-liability 
clause in a fire alarm system contract.119  The court recognized that the 
Connecticut Supreme Court had not addressed the issue yet, so it looked to 
the law of other jurisdictions to determine that the clause was enforceable 
because it was not unconscionable.120  The court also noted policy reasons 
to uphold the provision, observing that premises owners are in a better 
position to buy appropriate insurance for the property and that “limitations 
 
 113. Id. at 433 (Cercone, J., dissenting). 
 114. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text; see also Samson Sales, Inc. v. 
Honeywell, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 392, 393 (Ohio 1984); Wedner, 307 A.2d at 430–31. 
 115. See Warren, supra note 8, at 903–04 (arguing that courts engage in “sheer label 
application” by applying the penalty rule to underliquidated damages simply because 
litigants call these clauses “liquidated damages”). 
 116. See Bargaintown of D.C., Inc. v. Fed. Eng’g Co. of Wash., D.C., 309 A.2d 56, 57 
(D.C. 1973) (ruling that an alarm service contract was enforceable under both tests). 
 117. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 118. 990 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 119. Id. at 47–50. 
 120. Id. at 47–49. 
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on liability help keep alarm services affordable.”121  Subsequently, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Connecticut has followed Leon’s Bakery’s 
ruling on the enforceability of limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm system 
contracts, placing additional emphasis on the policy reasons for upholding 
these types of provisions.122 
2.  Connecticut Trial-Level Court Decisions 
Since Leon’s Bakery, Connecticut still has not issued any appellate-level 
rulings regarding whether limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service 
contracts are interpreted as exculpatory clauses or liquidated damages 
clauses.123  Connecticut trial-level courts (the Connecticut Superior Courts) 
have weighed in on the issue, though.124  So far, Connecticut Superior 
Courts have viewed these limitations of liability as liquidated damages 
clauses and have applied a three-prong test to determine their 
enforceability, considering whether (1) the damages are uncertain or 
difficult to prove, (2) the parties intended to liquidate damages in advance, 
and (3) the amount is “reasonable because it is not greatly disproportionate 
to the amount of damages which the parties assumed at the time of their 
contract would be sustained if the contract were breached.”125  This test has 
been applied with mixed results.126 
The reason why some limitation-of-liability clauses are enforceable under 
this test and why others are not has less to do with differences in the 
drafting of the contracts and more to do with how courts apply the first and 
third prongs of the test.  For example, in Forster v. Advanced Electronic 
Services, Inc.,127 the Superior Court of Connecticut held that a contract 
satisfied the first prong of the test (whether damages are uncertain or 
difficult to prove) because “[t]he defendant is not a property insurer and 
cannot be expected to know the value of a customer’s home and 
belongings.”128  The Forster Court also found that the third prong (whether 
 
 121. Id. at 49 (quoting Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1370 (N.Y. 
1992)). 
 122. See Omni Corp. v. Sonitrol Corp., 476 F. Supp. 2d 125, 129 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 123. At least one case acknowledged this uncertainty. See Mattegat v. Klopfenstein, 717 
A.2d 276, 280 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) (“It is unclear whether . . . the parties’ contract is a 
liquidated damages clause or a disclaimer of liability clause.”).  However, the clause at issue 
was found to be neither an enforceable liquidated damages clause nor an enforceable 
exculpatory clause. Id.  It is still uncertain, then, how a Connecticut court will rule if a 
limitation-of-liability clause passes one test but fails the other. 
 124. See Forster v. Advanced Elec. Servs., Inc., No. X03CV010510854S, 2002 WL 
31463511 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2002); Wyer v. Sonitrol Sec. Sys. of Hartford, Inc., 738 
A.2d 1179 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999); Hartford Ins. v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc., No. CV 
980357149, 1999 WL 259688 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 1999). 
 125. Wyer, 738 A.2d at 1182–83; accord Forster, 2002 WL 31463511, at *4; Hartford 
Ins., 1999 WL 259688, at *1. 
 126. Compare Forster, 2002 WL 31463511, at *4–5 (upholding a limitation-of-liability 
clause in an alarm service contract), and Hartford Ins., 1999 WL 259688, at *2 (same), with 
Wyer, 738 A.2d at 1183 (finding a limitation-of-liability clause in an alarm service contract 
to be an unenforceable penalty). 
 127. No. X03CV010510854S, 2002 WL 31463511 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2002). 
 128. Id. at *4. 
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the stipulated amount was greatly disproportionate to the amount of 
presumable loss from a breach of contract) was satisfied because “the 
[contract] price does not generally include a sum designed to anticipate the 
possible need to pay the purchaser the value of the property that the system 
is to protect.”129 
In contrast, the Superior Court of Connecticut held that a contract did not 
satisfy these two factors in Wyer v. Sonitrol Security Systems of Hartford, 
Inc.130 under very similar circumstances.  Regarding the first prong, the 
Wyer Court found that the value of the lost property was readily 
ascertainable and that an inventory of the property could have been 
conducted at the time of contracting.131  Under the third prong, the actual 
damages ($6,800) were found to be greatly disproportionate to the 
liquidated damages ($198.44).132 
As the conflicting federal and state rulings in Connecticut illustrate, the 
test to determine the enforceability of limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm 
service contracts, as well as the enforceability of the clauses themselves, is 
not settled law in all jurisdictions.  Furthermore, jurisdictions like the 
District of Columbia that apply both tests may eventually encounter a case 
where a provision passes one test but fails the other,133 forcing a decision as 
to which test actually is controlling. 
III.  AN OPPORTUNITY TO CRAFT A BETTER RULE 
The uncertainty in some states provides an opportunity to address which 
rule courts should apply and, more generally, whether limitation-of-liability 
clauses in alarm service contracts should be enforced when an alarm service 
provider negligently fails to provide its bargained-for services.  This part 
discusses the benefits of choosing one rule over the other by analyzing the 
implications each rule has for consumers, insurance companies, and the 
courts.  Part III.A argues that limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service 
contracts would be unenforceable penalties in jurisdictions that analyze 
such provisions as liquidated damages clauses.  It also argues that adopting 
this rule would create perverse incentives for alarm service companies to 
redraft their contracts.  Part III.B questions the conventional policy rationale 
provided by many courts for allowing alarm service providers to disclaim 
liability for negligence in limitation-of-liability clauses.  Finally, Part III.C 
proposes adopting the majority rule of analyzing limitation-of-liability 
clauses as exculpatory clauses and contends that certain limitation-of-
liability clauses in alarm service contracts should be void as a matter of 
public policy. 
 
 129. Id. at *5 (quoting Leon’s Bakery, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 990 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 
1993)). 
 130. 738 A.2d 1179 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999). 
 131. Id. at 1183. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See infra Part III.A. 
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A.  Perverse Incentives from Applying the Penalty Test 
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that if limitation-of-liability 
clauses like the provision in Better Food Markets are interpreted as 
liquidated damages clauses, they should not pass the penalty test.  This is 
primarily because, while the amount of damages might be difficult to 
estimate at the time of contracting, there is no reason to believe that 
damages flowing from an alarm service provider’s negligence would be 
difficult for the nonbreaching party to prove.134  In fact, property losses 
from theft, fire, or water damage are relatively simple to quantify.135  These 
types of losses stand in contrast to damages that are more difficult to 
calculate, such as revenue losses from breaches of nondisclosure or 
nonsolicitation agreements.136 
Moreover, the stipulated damages in alarm service contracts do not 
purport to be a reasonable estimate of anticipated or actual loss caused by a 
breach but instead fix an arbitrary amount, such as $50.137  As it is not 
difficult to prove damages, courts should give very little deference to this 
fixed amount.138  Additionally, it can hardly be said that this amount is 
designed to compensate the nonbreaching party for the other party’s failure 
to perform.139 
From this analysis, it appears that cases such as Samson Sales and Wyer 
correctly held that, when interpreted as liquidated damages clauses, 
limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service contracts are not enforceable 
when they limit a service provider’s liability to an unreasonably small 
amount for damages caused by the provider’s own negligence.  This reflects 
the general attitude that a plain underestimate of the probable loss from 
nonperformance of a contract is just as bad as an overestimate.140  To 
consumers of alarm services, refusing to enforce underliquidated damages 
clauses might seem like a good policy.  After all, if a plaintiff can prove that 
 
 134. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
 135. See Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 392, 394 (Ohio 1984) 
(finding damages from the breach of an alarm service contract to be “as readily ascertainable 
as the damages in a multitude of other conceivable situations involving negligence and/or 
breach of contract”). But see Forster v. Advanced Elec. Servs., Inc., No. 
X03CV010510854S, 2002 WL 31463511, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2002) (finding 
that the amount of fire damage that was specifically attributable to an alarm system’s failure 
would be difficult to ascertain). 
 136. See Overholt Crop Ins. Serv. v. Travis, 941 F.2d 1361, 1370 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(enforcing a liquidated damages clause because damages from breaches of nondisclosure and 
nonsolicitation agreements are difficult to calculate). 
 137. See Better Food Mkts. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 253 P.2d 10, 18 (Cal. 1953) (Carter, J., 
dissenting) (“The characteristic feature of a penalty is that it bears no relation to the actual 
damage which may be caused by a breach, but is arbitrarily fixed without any attempt to 
estimate the amount of injury.”).  Justice Jesse W. Carter, dissenting in Better Food Markets, 
suggested that the average amount of cash and inventory left in the store overnight would 
have been a reasonable estimate of damages. Id. at 17. 
 138. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 139. See generally JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 468 
(4th Cir. 2001) (stating that liquidated damages clauses are “based on the principle of just 
compensation”); 24 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 48, § 65:1. 
 140. See Fritz, supra note 8, at 202, 213–14. 
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an alarm company’s failure to perform its contractual duty was the 
proximate cause of property loss from a burglary or fire, why should she be 
limited to recovering such a seemingly small, arbitrarily determined amount 
of damages? 
At first glance, home and business owners might think that the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s approach in Samson Sales and the Connecticut Superior 
Court’s approach in Wyer—interpreting limitation-of-liability clauses as 
liquidated damages clauses—provides them with protection against 
unreasonable limitations of liability.  However, alarm service consumers 
might be worse off under such an approach because alarm service providers 
might respond by redrafting their contracts to eliminate the fixed damage 
amount and completely disclaim liability altogether.  By doing so, the 
limitation-of-liability clause would become an exculpatory clause instead. 
Generally, exculpatory clauses are enforceable unless they are 
unconscionable or contravene public policy.141  Exculpatory clauses that 
relieve a party from its own negligence, while disfavored, are upheld if 
expressed unambiguously and assented to by both contracting parties.142  
As this test focuses on different criteria than the penalty test does, a contract 
could potentially pass one test but fail the other.  An unenforceable 
limitation-of-liability clause, stripped of its liquidated damages, could thus 
become an enforceable exculpatory clause.143 
Consider, then, the ironic consequence of redrafting a contract to avoid a 
penalty test analysis:  a previously unenforceable provision limiting 
damages to $1,000 may suddenly become enforceable when the amount is 
changed to $0.  This perverse result reveals an inconsistency in jurisdictions 
that apply the penalty test to underliquidated damages but an 
unconscionability test to exculpatory clauses:  if the law allows a party to 
assume the entirety of risk with no remedy whatsoever (as one does by 
agreeing to an exculpatory clause), there is no reason to deny a party the 
ability to assume a part of that risk instead (as one does by agreeing to a 
limitation-of-liability clause).144 
Accordingly, treating limitation-of-liability clauses as liquidated damages 
clauses would create an incentive for alarm service providers to eliminate 
fixed damages provisions from their service contracts and replace them with 
complete disclaimers of liability for negligence.  If these complete 
disclaimers are enforceable, then alarm service consumers would be worse 
 
 141. See supra Part I.A. 
 142. B & D Assocs., Inc. v. Russell, 807 A.2d 1001, 1005–06 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); 
Mattegat v. Klopfenstein, 717 A.2d 276, 280 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998). 
 143. Compare Nahra v. Honeywell, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 962, 967 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 1995) 
(opining that an alarm service provider could “exculpate itself from all liability in an 
appropriately drafted contract”), with Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 
392, 394 (Ohio 1984) (ruling that limiting liability to $50 constitutes an unenforceable 
penalty). But see Braden v. Honeywell, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 724, 728–29 (S.D. Ohio 1998) 
(“[I]t is inconceivable that the Ohio Supreme Court would have refused enforcement of a 
clause limiting damages to $50.00 while at the same time would have enforced a clause 
preventing any liability under the same contract.”). 
 144. See 11 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 58.16 (rev. ed. 2005). 
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off.  After all, recovering an unreasonably small amount of damages from a 
service provider’s negligence is better than being barred from seeking any 
damages whatsoever.  Furthermore, reducing the cost of an alarm service 
provider’s negligence is unlikely to encourage providers to take more care 
in installing and monitoring their systems.145  This may result in a decrease 
in the quality of alarm systems.146  Not only would alarm service 
consumers be worse off, but society would also receive a reduced benefit 
from any positive externalities that alarm services generate.147 
The real issue then becomes whether these redrafted contracts that 
disclaim all liability for negligence would be enforceable, which depends 
on whether their exculpatory clauses are unconscionable or contrary to 
public policy.148  Thus, applying the penalty test to limitation-of-liability 
provisions merely postpones the eventual determination of whether 
disclaimers of liability in alarm service contracts are unconscionable or 
against public policy.  The underliquidated damages in cases like Better 
Food Markets were so unreasonably small in comparison to the actual 
losses that they were essentially token payments.149  As a “mere token 
payment is as objectionable as eliminating it altogether,”150 a jurisdiction 
might as well face the inevitable and determine whether limitation-of-
liability clauses in alarm service contracts are unconscionable or against 
public policy. 
Applying the penalty test to limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm 
service contracts may result in a short-lived victory for consumers.  
However, it might make consumers, insurers, and society worse off in the 
long run when alarm companies redraft their contracts to avoid the penalty 
test—unless, that is, the jurisdiction has ruled that complete disclaimers of 
liability for an alarm company’s negligence are unconscionable or against 
public policy. 
B.  Questioning the Conventional Policy Wisdom 
Having determined that analyzing the enforceability of limitation-of-
liability clauses in alarm service contracts using the penalty test may not be 
the best approach,151 the unconscionability and public policy analysis used 
to determine the enforceability of exculpatory clauses appears to be the 
obvious alternative.  Under this analysis, courts generally find that such 
clauses are not unconscionable or against public policy.152  However, there 
is reason to believe that the typical policy reasons for enforcing such 
clauses are misguided.  An alarm company trade association’s website 
 
 145. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 146. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 147. See generally Bruce L. Benson & Brent D. Mast, Privately Produced General 
Deterrence, 44 J.L. & ECON. 725, 729–31 (2001). 
 148. See supra Part I.A. 
 149. Recall that in Better Food Markets, liquidated damages were $50 while actual 
damages were over $35,000. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
 150. Fritz, supra note 8, at 210. 
 151. See supra Part III.A. 
 152. 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 69 (2004). 
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provides an illustrative example.  It asks the question “Why Won’t You be 
Responsible for Your Own Negligence?” and answers with the following: 
This question is posed thousands of times a year to security companies.  
The answer is that the security company is not the cause of the loss.  The 
burglar, robber, rapist, arsonist or other negligent party is the direct cause 
of the loss.  Security companies can do no more than detect.  The process 
of detection is not perfect.  THERE WILL BE FAILURES, human or 
otherwise.  The allocation of the cost of that risk to the security company 
would endanger the viability of the industry by creating exposures vastly 
disproportionate to the income derived.153 
This answer reflects several commonly proffered arguments for enforcing 
limitations of liability in alarm service contracts:  (1) that alarm companies 
are not the best insurers of their own failures and that holding otherwise 
would endanger the industry; (2) that the risk of burglary or fire is allocated 
to the customer, not the alarm company; and (3) that alarm companies are 
not responsible for losses caused by their own negligence because 
intervening tortfeasors are the direct cause of the losses.  The following 
sections address these issues, respectively. 
1.  The Better-Insurer Argument 
In Leon’s Bakery, the Second Circuit placed significant emphasis on the 
idea that premises owners are in a better position to purchase appropriate 
insurance for lost or damaged property.154  Placing such importance on the 
availability of insurance for premises owners, though, ignores a few 
realities of alarm service contracts.  The first is that an individual estimate 
of potential losses from burglaries or fires probably would not be overly 
burdensome to include in an alarm service contract because the company 
needs to visit the premises to install the alarm service in the first place.  
This level of individual interaction with the customer gives the alarm 
service company an opportunity to gather information about the customer.  
Alarm companies could price discriminate based on whether the alarmed 
premises is a home or business.  Within these categories, alarm companies 
could further discriminate based on neighborhood affluence or business 
type. 
The second reality is that emphasizing the ability of premises owners to 
obtain insurance ignores the fact that liability insurance is available for 
alarm service providers as well.155  These insurers would presumably raise 
 
 153. Limitations of Liability, CENT. STATION ALARM ASS’N INT’L, http://csaaintl.org/ 
issues/limitations-of-liability/#Why%20Won’t%20You%20be%20Responsible%20for%20 
Your%20OOO%20Negligence? (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/2DUF-K58M]. 
 154. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Alarm Contractors Business Insurance, HARTFORD, https:// 
www.thehartford.com/business-insurance/alarm-contractor (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/2KNH-R42L]; Alarm Contractors Insurance / Installers / Security 
Company, ALLRISKS, http://www.allrisks.com/industry-specialties/detail/alarm-companies 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/E3WY-CKAV]; BROWNYARD PROGRAMS, 
http://www.brownyardprograms.com/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/N4GZ-
WZCN]. 
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or lower insurance rates for alarm service providers based on the rate at 
which their service fails because of the provider’s negligence. 
However, the incentive for an alarm service provider to reduce its 
negligence rate is not present if the provider is able to exculpate itself from 
liability.156  This is because the nature of contract “is optional:  a party can 
either do a promised thing or pay damages.”157  Accordingly, an alarm 
service provider has an incentive to spend only the amount of money that is 
“just worth it” to guard against its own negligence.158  Where an alarm 
service provider is able to exculpate itself from liability, that amount is 
equal to the underliquidated damages provision.  This amount is not 
“efficient,” though, because the compensation does not mirror the value of 
full performance.159  As this Note has discussed at length, the damages 
from an alarm company’s negligence often far exceed the underliquidated 
damages provision. 
Furthermore, alarm service providers are likely the least-cost insurers of 
damages from their own negligence in these scenarios because they are in 
control of their own negligence rate.160  The cost of insuring against 
damages from an alarm company’s negligence would consist of two main 
expenses:  (1) the expected value of the underwriting loss to the insurer and 
(2) transaction costs, such as the cost of determining the probability of 
nonperformance and the cost of negotiation and communication with the 
insured.161  Here, the alarm company has an advantage over a third-party 
insurer.  The cost of negotiation and communication with the insured will 
be similar for alarm companies and third-party insurers alike, but the alarm 
 
 156. See Burnham, supra note 9, at 381 (noting that “exculpation undermines the 
deterrent effect of tort liability”).  Judge Richard A. Posner criticized this idea in Edwards v. 
Honeywell, Inc., 50 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1995), where he opined: 
  Pointing to the $250 limitation of the alarm service’s liability to the 
[homeowners], the plaintiff argues that if Honeywell prevails in this suit, alarm 
services will have no incentive to take care.  But they will.  Honeywell lost the 
[homeowners’] business.  Our society relies more heavily on competition than on 
liability to optimize the quality of the goods and services supplied by the private 
sector of the economy.  A case such as this does Honeywell’s customer relations 
no good even if it wins the case . . . . 
Id. at 491.  However, Judge Posner’s approach, which requires a consumer to “shop around 
and perhaps forego the activity, may not adequately protect consumers from exculpatory 
clauses in modern business dealings.” Guissinger, supra note 9, at 800.  Competition may 
not adequately protect consumers from exculpatory clauses because (1) markets might be 
monopolistic rather than competitive, (2) inadequate information may be available to 
consumers, and (3) boilerplate language only becomes important when something goes 
wrong. See id. at 800 n.35 (citing Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—
Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 351 (1970)). 
 157. Warren, supra note 8, at 915. 
 158. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 10, at 581. 
 159. See id. at 558. 
 160. See id. at 583 (“[T]here are strong economic arguments that suggest that the vendor 
is the lowest-cost insurer against non-performance . . . [when] the vendor has some control 
over the probability of externally caused non-performance.”). 
 161. See id. at 579–80. 
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company is in a superior position to know the probability that it will 
negligently fail to perform its service.162 
More importantly, the alarm company is able to exercise some control 
over the rate at which it will negligently fail to perform its service.163  Thus, 
the alarm company is in a unique position to reduce the expected value of 
the underwriting loss by taking steps to reduce its negligence rate.164  The 
alarm company would therefore have an incentive to spend resources to 
decrease its negligence rate up to the point where it is “just worth it.”165  
Hence, even if the alarm company would incur the same transaction costs as 
a third-party insurer, the alarm company has an efficiency advantage.166  As 
between an alarm service customer, the customer’s third-party insurer, and 
an alarm service company, net welfare would increase if alarm companies 
were required to insure against their own negligence. 
For example, suppose that a customer purchases third-party liability 
insurance and an alarm service and pays $2,000 a year for each contract.  
Part of the price of the third-party liability insurance is the risk that losses 
may occur from the alarm company’s negligence—say, $200 of the contract 
price.  Now assume the alarm service company is liable for losses caused 
by its own negligence.  The alarm company will now have an incentive to 
reduce its negligence rate and will increase the cost of its service to account 
for its increased liability.  Supposing the alarm company halved its 
negligence rate, the new alarm contract price would be $2,100.  However, 
the third-party insurer no longer has to insure against the risk of the alarm 
company’s negligence, so it would be able to reduce its price to $1,800.  
This results in a net welfare increase of $100. 
The upshot is that consumers will end up paying less in total for property 
insurance and alarm services because alarm companies will take steps to 
reduce the rate of their negligence.  Not only does this benefit consumers, 
but the reduction in burglary and fire losses presumably benefits society as 
a whole.  Consumers should be willing to pay the higher prices alarm 
service companies would have to charge to compensate for their increased 
liability because of the lower property insurance prices and increase in the 
quality of alarm services.  This strongly calls into question the contention 
that an increase in liability would make alarm services prohibitively costly. 
While courts cite the availability of third-party liability insurance as a 
policy reason in support of enforcing limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm 
service contracts, a detailed analysis of the party that is actually in the best 
position to insure against an alarm company’s negligence reveals that 
society as a whole would benefit if alarm companies were liable for their 
own negligence.  Accordingly, public policy favors finding these clauses 
unenforceable. 
 
 162. See id. at 580. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. at 581. 
 166. See id. at 582. 
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2.  The Risk-Allocation Argument 
As an additional policy reason to enforce limitation-of-liability clauses in 
alarm service contracts, some courts find that these provisions represent the 
parties’ decision to consciously allocate the risk of burglary or fire to the 
customer rather than to the alarm service company.167  One court noted that 
“[f]or the small compensation received obviously [the alarm company] 
could not afford to assume responsibilities such as are assumed in the case 
of fire insurance coverage.”168  Another court opined that holding an alarm 
service company liable for damages caused by its negligence “would in 
practical effect excuse the homeowner from having to insure the property 
and would shift the risk of its loss to the burglar alarm manufacturer.”169 
These fears of requiring alarm service companies to become general 
casualty insurers are misplaced.  The plaintiffs in the cases cited by this 
Note were not contending that alarm service providers should be liable for 
all burglaries and fires.  Rather, they are simply arguing that alarm service 
providers should be liable for losses caused by the alarm company’s own 
negligence.  Thus, if a burglar breaks into a store and the alarm company 
alerts the police according to the terms of its contract, the alarm company 
would not be liable simply because the police fail to catch the burglar.  The 
scenario at issue is where the alarm company negligently fails to alert the 
police and the plaintiff can prove that the alarm company’s failure to 
perform its contractual duty was the proximate cause of her loss—as was 
the case in Better Food Markets.170 
Alarm service providers are not being asked to become insurers against 
burglaries or fires.  They are being asked to become insurers against their 
own negligence.  As alarm companies are the least-cost insurers of their 
own negligence,171 it is in society’s best interest to expect them to bear this 
burden.172 
3.  The Intervening-Tortfeasor Argument 
Another policy issue some courts raise when deciding a limitation-of-
liability clause’s enforceability is the difficulty in calculating an alarm 
company’s portion of liability for losses caused by an intervening 
 
 167. See Fireman’s Fund Am. Ins. v. Burns Elec. Sec. Servs., Inc., 417 N.E.2d 131, 133 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980); see also Warren, supra note 8, at 932–33 (describing the perception that 
“underliquidated damages provisions were frequently the result of deliberate risk 
allocation”). 
 168. Atkinson v. Pac. Fire Extinguisher Co., 253 P.2d 18, 21 (Cal. 1953). 
 169. Lobianco v. Prop. Prot., Inc., 437 A.2d 417, 424 (Pa. Super Ct. 1981). 
 170. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 172. Though not desirable, should it nevertheless be permissible for alarm companies to 
contract away liability for their own negligence?  Part III.C, infra, answers this question in 
the negative. 
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tortfeasor.173  An intervening tortfeasor is an actor who brings about harm 
after another’s negligent act or omission.174  Applied to burglar alarm 
service failures, a burglar is an intervening tortfeasor who causes harm after 
an alarm company’s negligent failure to call the police.  Recall that one 
policy justification provided by the alarm service trade association’s 
website was that “the security company is not the cause of the loss.  The 
burglar, robber, rapist, arsonist or other negligent party is the direct cause of 
the loss.”175 
Despite an intervening tortfeasor being the direct cause of the loss, 
another actor’s negligence will create liability if “the actor at the time of his 
negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a 
situation might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the 
opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.”176  When it comes to an alarm 
service company’s negligent failure to provide its service, it is obvious that 
the company realized or should have realized the likelihood of losses 
caused by a third person’s criminal act, as such crimes were expressly 
contemplated during contract formation.  Indeed, the court in Central Alarm 
of Tucson v. Ganem177 noted that “[i]t is hard to imagine circumstances 
more appropriate than those before us, where the only reason for installation 
and maintenance of the alarm system was the foreseeability of a possible 
burglary attempt.”178  Accordingly, the foreseeability of damages caused by 
a burglar if an alarm service negligently fails to provide its contractual 
obligations means that alarm companies are still liable even if the burglar is 
the direct cause of the loss.179 
On close inspection, the public policy arguments typically cited in 
support of enforcing limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service 
contracts are unconvincing.  While it is true that customers can purchase 
third-party liability insurance to cover the risk of alarm companies 
negligently failing to provide their services, alarm companies themselves 
 
 173. See Warren, supra note 8, at 913 n.80 (“[S]ome courts note the difficulty of 
litigating how much the failure of the alarm system increased the loss from fire or 
burglary.”). 
 174. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 441 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 175. Limitations of Liability, supra note 153. 
 176. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448. 
 177. 567 P.2d 1203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). 
 178. Id. at 1206 (citations omitted).  The Ganem court went on to find that the burglary 
“was certainly within the ambit of risk” created by the alarm company’s failure and that, but 
for the alarm company’s negligence, “the loss would not have occurred approximately 99 
times out of 100, based on the success rate of a properly maintained system.” Id. at 1206. 
 179. Cf. Monitronics Int’l, Inc. v. Veasley, 746 S.E.2d 793, 801 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) 
(finding that an alarm company was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries when she 
was sexually assaulted by an intruder).  The precise manner in which liability should be 
apportioned is beyond the scope of this Note.  However, any difficulty in calculating 
damages seems like a slender reed to rest an argument against holding alarm service 
providers accountable for damages they proximately caused, especially considering the 
willingness of courts to apportion liability—despite intervening tortfeasors—in other areas 
of the law. See generally E.L. Kellett, Annotation, Private Person’s Duty and Liability for 
Failure to Protect Another Against Criminal Attack by Third Person, 10 A.L.R.3d 619 
(1966). 
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would be the most efficient insurers of their own negligence.  Imposing this 
liability on alarm companies would not force companies to assume a 
customer’s general casualty risks.  Instead, it would incentivize companies 
to reduce their negligence rates by forcing them to account for the 
consequences of their mistakes.  Finally, as the consequences of an alarm 
company’s failure to provide its services are foreseeable, such a failure 
would be the proximate cause of a customer’s damages even if a burglar or 
an unattended stove is the direct cause of the loss. 
C.  A New Public Policy Approach 
While it traditionally has been employed to enforce limitation-of-liability 
clauses in alarm service contracts, the unconscionability and public policy 
test is still the best approach for courts to adopt because it provides courts 
with the flexibility to protect consumers from particularly egregious 
limitation-of-liability clauses. 
Courts should rule that underliquidated damages clauses in alarm service 
contracts that provide nominal damages in gross disproportion to actual 
damages are substantively unconscionable.  It is commonplace for service 
contracts to disclaim consequential damages by limiting liability to the cost 
of the service.180  By doing so, even though the customer is denied her 
traditional expectancy remedy under contract law, she is at least able to 
protect her restitution interest.  Alarm service contracts that limit liability to 
unreasonably small damages in the event of an alarm company’s negligence 
deny the customer her expectancy and restitution interest.  Imagine how 
this provision would read in any other service contract:  “We will charge 
you $1,250 for our services.  If, through our own failure to exercise 
ordinary care, we fail to provide those services, your damages are limited to 
$250.”  Such a contract seems absurd.  Its terms are “so oppressive that no 
reasonable person would make them and no fair and honest person would 
accept them.”181  In other words, it is substantively unconscionable.  
Nevertheless, this is essentially what courts are enforcing when they uphold 
limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service contracts. 
Courts should not enforce limitation-of-liability provisions in alarm 
service contracts that ignore all remedies under contract law.  If a customer 
cannot be put in the position she would have been in had the alarm service 
company provided its service, she should at least be able to be put in her 
precontract position.  Otherwise, the alarm company has made the customer 
worse off than she was before.  However, the continuous relationship 
between alarm service providers and customers makes restitution 
 
 180. See Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. v. Pest Doctor Sys., Inc., No. 3:14-CV-143, 2015 WL 
4945767, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2015) (“To the fullest extent permitted by law, [the 
service company] will not be liable for personal injury, death, property damage, loss of use, 
loss of income or any other damages whatsoever, including consequential and incidental 
damages, arising from this service.  [The service company’s] liability is specifically limited 
to the labor and products necessary to [perform the service].”). 
 181. Burnham, supra note 9, at 384. 
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problematic.182  A viable alternative, then, is to protect the customer’s 
expectancy interest by refusing to enforce the unconscionable provision and 
allowing the customer to proceed with her underlying claim for actual 
damages. 
On the public policy side, courts would be free to demand that, to be 
enforceable, limitation-of-liability clauses must better compensate the 
nonbreaching party—especially after recognizing that the traditional policy 
rationales for enforcing limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service 
contracts no longer provide sufficient justifications for shifting the burden 
of an alarm service provider’s negligence onto the consumer.183  From an 
efficiency perspective, social policy dictates that alarm service providers 
should not be able to disclaim liability for negligently failing to provide 
their services, because they are likely to be the least-cost insurers of their 
own negligence.184 
In the majority of states, the policy of freedom of contract typically 
outweighs other policies, with the exception of areas of public interest.185  
“Freedom of contract is generally believed to be a good thing.  And so is 
the concept that one who acts negligently should be held responsible for the 
injury caused by his or her act.”186  In the context of alarm service 
contracts, holding alarm companies accountable for damages caused by 
their negligence is an area of public interest courts should consider.  
Enforcing underliquidated damages clauses in alarm service contracts 
creates an incentive for alarm service providers to pay a nominal fee rather 
than spend the appropriate level of resources to reduce the rate of their own 
negligence.187  Here, the social interest in avoiding the needless waste 
associated with the inefficient use of resources “may be great enough that 
freedom to limit liability for negligent injury to another’s . . . property 
should be curtailed.”188  The question, then, is whether this social objective 
is “important enough that individuals should not be permitted to interfere 
with them by shifting the incidence of risks”189 and whether the courtroom 
is an appropriate place to make this determination. 
Public policy has been described as “a very unruly horse, and when once 
you get astride it you never know where it will carry you.”190  Some have 
argued that a court cannot properly weigh the advantages and disadvantages 
of such policy decisions because the “primary function of a court is to 
resolve the specific dispute before it.”191  Thus, “[u]nlike a legislature, a 
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court cannot hold open hearings, inviting testimony as to costs, risks, etc., 
from all interested parties.”192  Accordingly, matters of public interest 
might be addressed more effectively by legislatures rather than by courts.193 
Indeed, the New York State Legislature has prohibited the owners of 
pools, gymnasiums, places of amusement or recreation, or similar 
establishments from disclaiming their liability for damages caused by the 
owner’s negligence, declaring such limitations of liability “void as against 
public policy and wholly unenforceable.”194  A legislature could similarly 
declare limitations of liability for damages caused by an alarm company’s 
negligence to be void as a matter of public policy.  A state-by-state 
legislative solution has the additional appeal of allowing elected 
representatives, rather than judges, to make the determination of whether 
freedom of contract outweighs the importance of holding negligent parties 
accountable for the injuries they cause.  This decision may differ based on 
the ideals of the citizenry in each state. 
A legislative solution also may have benefits in terms of certainty.195  
Clear rules regarding liability would allow alarm service companies to price 
their services to reflect their exposure to liability.  The alarm-company-as-
best-insurer-of-its-own-negligence argument works only if the alarm 
company knows about its liability in advance so that it can price its service 
accordingly.  Additionally, the efficiency benefits from the alarm company 
acting as the least-cost insurer may be reduced if liability is excessively 
litigated after every incident.  A clear public policy statement from a state’s 
legislature regarding the enforceability of limitations of liability for an 
alarm company’s negligence could curtail litigation by making the outcome 
of these lawsuits more certain. 
Overall, the extreme discrepancy between actual damages and 
underliquidated damages in a typical case where an alarm company 
negligently fails to provide its contractual services, along with the 
efficiency and public policy gains from holding alarm companies liable for 
their own negligence, favor finding limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm 
service contracts unconscionable and contrary to public policy.  Applying 
an unconscionability and public policy test strikes at the heart of the 
matter—whether these clauses are too unfair to enforce—rather than 
creating loopholes, and it provides the additional benefit of allowing state 
legislatures to weigh in on the matter. 
 
(discussing how “[r]emedies are granted on a case-by-case basis,” while “legislatures 
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CONCLUSION 
Limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm service contracts present a unique 
challenge for courts.  Unlike exculpatory clauses in contracts for 
recreational activities, which relieve a party from liability for damages 
caused by negligence while providing a service, limitation-of-liability 
clauses in alarm service contracts limit an alarm company’s liability for 
negligently failing to provide bargained-for services.  However, unlike a 
true liquidated damages provision, limitation-of-liability clauses do not 
purport to estimate the harm caused by nonperformance.  How, then, should 
courts determine their enforceability?  Should they be enforced at all? 
A policy that refuses to enforce limitation-of-liability clauses in alarm 
service contracts on the basis that they are unenforceable penalties may 
simply create a loophole to be exploited by clever drafting.  Ultimately, the 
real question is whether these provisions are unconscionable or void as a 
matter of public policy.  As a market exists for alarm services, courts are 
unlikely to find these provisions procedurally unconscionable.  However, 
the conventional explanations for why limitation-of-liability clauses are not 
substantively unconscionable or contrary to public policy are unconvincing.  
Refusing to enforce these clauses would not force alarm companies to 
become general casualty insurers.  Rather, alarm companies would be 
insurers only against their own negligence.  As alarm companies 
themselves—not third-party insurers—are the least-cost insurers of their 
own negligence, holding alarm companies accountable for their own 
negligence would advance public policy interests. 
While freedom of contract is an important concept, so is the notion that a 
party should be held accountable for negligently injuring others.  When 
these two concepts conflict, public policy considerations may tip the scales 
in favor of one or the other.  Here, the obligation of care owed by alarm 
service companies to their customers outweighs the traditional regard for 
freedom of contract.  When it comes to provisions in alarm service 
contracts that limit an alarm company’s liability for damages caused by its 
own negligence, public policy favors holding alarm companies responsible 
for their negligence. 
 
